This article, synthesizing the available (published and unpublished) evidence, describes patterns of inclusion of African-Americans, women, and working-class youth into the system of higher education from 1960 to 1986. Focusing not only on whether access has increased, but on whether these subordinate groups have gained access to elite institutions, this article examines the three groups in and across two periods (1960-76; 1976-86) to highlight differential patterns of access and to suggest a plausible explanation involving political mobilization to account for the observed trends. Although the general expansion of the system of higher education since 1960 has led to reduced differentials in access between dominant and subordinate groups, women and blacks-who mobilized-were able to gain access even to elite institutions. Workingclass youth did not experience such gains. A key factor that mediates these benefits of political mobilization is the recognition of the group as an official category in the society's system of classification. Using a variety of data sources, this article shows that, during times of both mobilization and countermobilization, access to particular levels of the higher education hierarchy generally follows the hypothesized directions. Further research that focuses on the precise mechanisms by which political mnobilization produces the observed results is called for.
I. Introduction
In this article, I present a distillation of the published (and some unpublished) evidence on the access of African-Americans, women, and working-class youth to higher education from 1960 to 1986. In addition, I examine the available information on where, within the system of higher education, students from these groups have been located. Finally. I propose a tentative explanation-involving political address the precise mechanisms that led to the changes in access to different parts of the higher education system for women, workingclass, and African-American students, the comparative framework provides the necessary leverage to highlight differential patterns of access that suggest the important role played by political mobilization and countermobilization. In the next two sections, I shall review the data on access to higher education for women, blacks, and working-class students from 1960-76 and 1976-86. In addition, I shall pay particular attention to where, within the higher educational system, these groups have been located. Finally, I will introduce the political mobilization perspective in detail, suggesting precisely how it illuminates the patterns that have been observed.
II. Access to Higher Education, 1960-76 High School Graduation Rates
Probably the most important factor in increasing black and workingclass representation in higher education-given a relatively constant rate of college attendance among high school graduates4-has been the huge increase in high school graduation rates. Among those 25-29 years old, the percentage of high school graduates in the population has increased from approximately 61 percent in 1960 to 83 percent in 1975. Black and white rates have become much closer. In 1960, 63.7 percent of whites and 38.6 percent of blacks had been graduated from high school; by 1975, however, the gap had narrowed to a 13-percentage-point difference with a white rate of 84.4 percent and a black rate of 71 percent.3 With respect to working-class high school graduation rates, I have computed, on the basis of the 1973 Current Population Survey Supplement ("Occupational Changes in a Generation" [OCG] ), educational attainment rates for those who were 25-34 years old in 1963 and 1973.6 For sons of fathers who completed seven or fewer years of schooling, the percentage who at least had been graduated from high school increased from 53.9 to 58.2 percent for the two cohorts. Sons of fathers who had had at least some college attained this level of education at rates of 94.5 and 95.8 percent for these cohorts. During these years. then, we see that "class" differences in attaining high school graduation have been somewhat reduced.
Women's participation in higher education follows a different path from that of other subordinate groups because, growing up in the same families, they share the same social backgrounds as men. The specific nature of gender oppression, then, sets women apart as we attempt to understand their educational trajectories. As far back as data are available (1870), more women than men were graduated from high school in any given year. Perhaps the most extreme ratio was in 1900, when the number of women being graduated was 50 percent higher than the number of men (57,000 to 38,000). Although the male-female difference is not as extreme today, women's high school graduation rates continue to surpass men's (U.S. Department of Education 1987b, p. 83). Despite this long-term continuous high school graduation advantage, however, women's higher education enrollments did not surpass men's until 1979 (U.S. Department of Education, 1987b, p. 122).
Enrollments in Higher Education
Between 1960 and 1975, total enrollment in institutions of higher education in the United States more than tripled, increasing from 3.6 million to 11.3 million students.7 In such a situation in which the number of places within the system of higher education expanded so massively, we would expect that groups that had previously been relatively poorly represented-for our focus, women, blacks, and workingclass youth-would increase their presence. In the 1960-76 period, the number of women college students per 100 men went from 59 to 89 (37 to 47 percent; see table 1), signaling a massive relative increase in women's enrollments. Notwithstanding the structural growth of the system that permitted this change and the worldwide secular increase in women's participation in higher education (Ramirez and Boli 1987 ), women's changing labor force participation, rising divorce rates, and lower fertility must be seen as precipitants both of the growth of women's enrollments (see Walters 1986) and, as I will argue below, of the origins and further trajectory of the women's movement (see Klein 1984 
* Figures are for undergraduates rather than total degree-credit enrollnment. Althoiugh the foct
it is only in recent years that these data have been collected. Although these figures clearly ov earlier (lata, I assume that the differences do not significantly affect the overall observed tren t "Other prestigious" are those colleges ratiked "most selective" or "highly selective" (exclud (1972 and 1941 evidence the highest dependence of college attendance on father's occupation).9 Second, between the time of the Project TALENT study (1961) and the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, it appears that there was a slightly greater relative increase in high school graduates' college attendance from lower socioeconomic groups than from higher groups (see Peng 1977) . Recognizing that high school graduation rates increased more at lower than at higher socioeconomic levels during this period, we see more clearly that the gap in college access has been reduced.'0 Third, using data from Current Population Reports, Suter (1980, p. 22) presents data that suggest that, among people of college age, there was between 1960 and 1977 a slight diminution in the difference in the rates of college attendance between those from families with incomes under $10,000 and those with incomes over $20,000 (constant dollars)." Overall, then, because of increases in rates of high school graduation and because top socioeconomic groups reached a ceiling in their rates of college entrance, it appears that class differentials in access to higher education have diminished. During a period in which the system of higher education massively expanded. all three subordinate groups, then, experienced relative increases in their college participation. As noted above, there was a tremendous change in the representation of African-Americans in institutions of higher education in the period under discussion. Although data on where people go to college are incomplete, I shall attempt to show that blacks were able to make inroads even into the top institutions. Using a number of different data sources, it appears that there were increases in black attendance at top institutions between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. Two sources use the concept of "college rank" to indicate differences among postsecondary institutions, although the definitions used are somewhat different. To assess change over time, then, one must look at the ratio of black to white percentages at "high-rank" colleges within a given year (and a given definition) rather than examine changes over time in the percentages for each race. table 4 ). While growth at the bottom of the system was substantial, there is no gainsaying the significant increases in black enrollments at elite institutions during this period.
Finally, let us examine the college destinations of working-class/ lower SES students. Although data are somewhat crude, it may even be the case that the relationship between being from a lower socioeconomic background and being located lower in the higher education hierarchy has become stronger. The reason for this "increasing stratification" hypothesis is that as more and more students complete high school, the college-eligible pool expands. Thus, students who a few years before would not have been able to go to college could, under new conditions, attend an institution of higher education. However, both because the "new" students are less selected than students had been in the past and because of the tremendous expansion of community colleges, students of working-class origin may have become increasingly likely to attend community colleges (Karabel 1972 It seems, however, that students from lower educational backgrounds did not make inroads into top-tier institutions, as was evident with African-Americans and with women.
Using various ACE reports, McPherson (1978, p. 172) presents evidence on the relationship between type of institution and family income that is consistent with the "increasing stratification" hypothesis. At private universities, students from families with incomes less than half the median were 8 percent of all students in 1966 and 7 percent in 1975. Students from families with incomes more than twice the median increased their representation from 32 to 36 percent in 1966-75. At the other end of the higher educational spectrum, at public two-year colleges, the students from poorer families increased their representation from 17 to 20 percent in this period, while the students from well-off homes decreased their representation from 11 to 9. These data based on income, then, support the notion that, as more working-class students have entered postsecondary institutions, they have become relatively more concentrated in the lowest tier.
Although the evidence for certain specific points could be more convincing, the main thrust of this survey of the distribution of three distinctly defined (but empirically overlapping) subordinate groups among different levels of the higher education hierarchy is that women and African-Americans have been able to move into top-tier institutions in ways that those from working-class groups have not. To the extent, then, that race and gender have become important categories that are relevant to the distribution of and mobilization for scarce resources-of which access to elite educational institutions is a prime example-and being of working-class or of low SES has not become an important category, our anticipated explanation of increasing access for all groups (as a result of structural change) but access to the top only for the mobilized groups becomes understandable.
III. Access to Higher Education, 1976-86
During the decade 1975-85, despite dire predictions about declines in enrollments, total enrollment in institutions of higher education increased by 9.5 percent to 12.25 million students, with most of that growth coming before 1980. The question is where this growth came from and whether there were changes in subordinate groups' relative place within the system of higher education. I shall first discuss changes in blacks' enrollment in higher education, followed by a discussion of women's place in higher education, and concluding with a discussion of the effect of socioeconomic origins on recent enrollment patterns. With respect to where blacks were located within higher education, it is noteworthy, during this time of slackening overall enrollments and of increasing relative costs, that there were not disproportionate declines for blacks in elite institutions of higher education (see table 2). If blacks had not established themselves as an official category and attracted the attention of both government and higher education officials, it is likely that we would have witnessed a disproportionate decline at top-tier colleges. Below, I will explore working-class access (with no official categoryl') to examine this contention more closely.
Women 1976 and 1986 (.80 to .99) and less likely to be found in private universities (.31 to .27). Among students whose fathers were college graduates, on the other hand, it seems that their representation in two-year colleges and in private universities declined (relative to the percentage of 40-49-year-old men in the population who are at least college graduates). To highlight the difference in where students from different backgrounds attend college, I have computed in table 5 a set of odds ratios that compares the probability of attending a private university to the probability of attending a two-year college (given the educational distribution of 40-49-year-old males). According to this measure, between 1976 and 1986, students from lower educational backgrounds became more concentrated in lower-tier colleges and students from college-graduate homes became more concentrated in private universities. Overall, although there is some evidence that working-class representation in higher education has remained relatively constant during the past decade, there is also reason to believe that there has been an increase in stratification in where these students go within the system of higher education-a situation that appears to be absent for the previously mobilized black population.
IV. Political Mobilization and Higher Education Enrollments
As mentioned above, in this section, I focus on the role of political mobilization in effecting changes in higher education access for blacks, women, and working-class youth. I argue that political mobilization (and countermobilization) affects enrollments in higher education through its impact both on people's perceptions of the opportunity structure (and hence on their aspirations19) and on social policy directed at opening educational and occupational opportunity. The logic of the analysis stems from the comparative fact that, during this period, blacks and women have mobilized and have gained recognition as official social categories, whereas those from lower socioeconomic groupings have not. A key test of whether there are gains in access to valued resources as a result of political mobilization is whether the mobilized groups have been able to gain access to elite institutions of higher education. It is, after all, in these elite institutions that elaborate gatekeeping processes have been instituted (Karen 1985 (Karen , 1990 ) and from these elite institutions that future elites are disproportionately selected (see Pierson 1969; Useem and Karabel 1986). I see political mobilization as involving a collective effort on the part of individuals who are excluded from some critical resource (e.g., access to higher education) to change existing patterns of institutionalized behavior. This process may take many forms and occur at many levels and with many different kinds of participants. A key measure of the success of a given mobilization involves the realization of an official status in the society's system of classification (e.g., as codified in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which was supposed to enforce the desegregation of higher education institutions; see Trent and Braddock 1988) . Bourdieu (1984, pp. 480-81) captures this idea when he states that "[a] group's presence or absence in the official classification depends on its capacity to get itself recognized, to get itself noticed and admitted, and so to win a place in the social order." Countermobilization involves the reassertion of power on the part of dominant groups to attempt to restore the status quo ante.
If political mobilization is to be seen as an important contextual element in particular kinds of increases in higher education attendance, then countermobilization on the part of entrenched groups should be expected to lead to decreases in enrollments. And, as with the mobilization for increased access, the effects of cauntermobilization should be seen in terms of both actual (e.g., specific social policies affecting financial aid availability) and perceived opportunity. It is not only that barriers to access will have been made higher but that people will have become less inclined to hurdle them.
The recognition of a subordinate group as an official social category, attained via classification struggles (see Bourdieu 1984) in the larger society, is a key mediating factor in the effect of political mobilization on higher education enrollments. In fact, it seems that certain institutions, attendant both to black political mobilization on their campuses and the federal government's linkage of institutional subsidies to the implementation of affirmative action plans, eventually instituted extensive recruitment programs. During the early 1970s competition for "highly able" black students became intense, with prestigious colleges offering them all-expenses-paid campus visits (see Weinberg 1977, p. 34). Stadtman (1980, pp. 128-30) reports that recruitment efforts were much more likely to be found in upper-tier than in lower-tier institutions. Not only does the official categorization lead a specific institution of higher education to attend to the group, but it also continuously implores group members to define themselves as a group and to maintain a presence on campus. Because of their entrenchment in bureaucracies of elite institutions, these categories help preserve the gains of subordinate groups in elite institutions of higher education even if there are declines elsewhere in the system, as in the period of countermobilization.
In arguing that political mobilization has had effects on access to college, I do not mean to imply that it has been, in a given case, a precipitating or final cause. Other factors, no doubt, have been important as well. Specifically, it is important to view the government-both federal and state-as a key actor in mediating the effect of political mobilization on college access. Government officials, often for their own reasons, might wish to pay special attention to the claims of particular groups.20 Thus, higher educational expansion or retrenchment might have been on the agenda of a key education official when other groups mobilized for or against increased access. It is also the case, as Brint and Karabel (1989) Since, during this time, the cost of higher education rose by a considerably larger amount than the rate of inflation, declining Federal aid meant that these funds were even less able to defray the costs of a college education. Finally, the entire tenor of the debate about education in the United States was focused on a "back to basics" program or a return to upholding standards-especially quantitative, measurable standards such as standardized tests. Evidently, our standards were falling and they needed to be raised; raising them would not only educate our young people but restore us to our proper place atop the world economy.24 Apparently, those behind the movement to restore standards saw a relationship between the declining relative place in the world economy and the recent democratization of our educational system. In short, during this period of countermobilization. many factors shaped the context within which onie might expect that blacks' percentage share of higher education enrollments would have declined.
With respect to women's enrollments, it seems that the women's movement may be likened to the GI Bill in the effect it had on a single group's higher education enrollments: it established a new threshold of education and of educational expectations for women in the context of a changed structure of opportunity. Since women always represented a greater percentage of high school graduates than men, in the absence of gender differences in access to educational and occupational opportunities, one might have expected women to have represented a greater percentage of college students than men. Once the women's movement began and federal legislation affected the opportunity structure, women's enrollments began to overtake men's.
Thus, the countermobilization did not affect disproportionately the enrollment of women and blacks in elite institutions of higher education, despite tuition increases that outpaced inflation (particularly among elite schools). With respect to overall enrollments, although black enrollments have declined, women's enrollments have not.25
V. Discussion
This survey of changes in enrollments in higher education for three subordinate groups has shown that there appears to be a relationship between political mobilization and access to valued resources. Groups that mobilized made inroads even into elite institutions, while the group that did not mobilize appeared to make no such gains. As noted throughout, there are numerous problems of data comparability in adducing evidence for this hypothesis. Nevertheless, through triangulation and comparison, the hypothesized trends do appear to have been confirmed. Further research on the precise mechanisms through which political mobilization exerts these effects is certainly necessary.
In a parallel effort to assess changes by race, class, and gender in access to higher education with the use of individual-level data, Alexander et al. (1987b, p. 181) found that SES differences in access to higher education were the most intractable. Perhaps because of political mobilization and groups' victories in the classification struggle, SES differences are smaller for blacks than for whites, and, within SES levels, blacks are generally more likely than whites to attend college. Of course, the huge differences in SES between blacks and whites points to the large distance that must still be traversed to attain equality of access to higher education.
Although the gains were certainly real, black and female increases in higher education followed a pattern that could probably be best described as a "co-optation response" of privileged groups to subordinate groups' demands. This pattern is one that allows for increases at the top but insures that the greatest absolute change is at the bottom of the system. Thus, access to higher education increases; access to elite institutions increases; but the lion's share of the change is concentrated in lowest-tier institutions. Despite the mobilization, then, blacks and women continue to be found disproportionately in the sector of higher education that yields the smallest socioeconomic returns (Dougherty 1987; Brint and Karabel 1989). Although the establishment of an official category protected blacks from a disproportionate decline in elite institutions, we might have found that there had been no falloff at all. I suspect that during the period of countermobilization many elite institutions continued their strong recruitment efforts, but, in the face of declining federal aid, the gutting of affirmative action enforcement, and the associated declining aspirations, they were less successful than they had been previously.
Just as groups on individual campuses have mobilized and have been successful in gaining greater admissions attention for alumni status, for race, and for test scores (see Karen, 1990 ), we also see that, at the national level, successful political mobilization appears to be associated with gains in access to higher education for those who mobilized. Although expanding the overall pie of higher education enrollments yields benefits to all subordinate groups, it seems that it is only when the threat from below is strong and pervasive that traditional selection criteria may be amended to allow for the admission of previously excluded groups. In this situation, one must look to the perceptions and interests of governmental and university elites for the keys-in both senses-to admission to the prestigious institutions. 1. Numerous problems of data comparability afflict the current endeavor. Over the years, the various organizations that have collected information about higher education enrollments have changed their definitions about everything from how a student is classified (resident degree-credit, total, undergraduate, extension, unclassified, etc.) to the kinds of institutions that are enumerated (four-year vs. two-year; universities, other four-year, two-year; doctoral, com-were collected. This difficulty in data collection, of course, is even more true for working-class/low-SES students, who are still not an official category in a similar sense.
Notes
9. In using the OCG study to make this claim it is important to note that overall-across all cohorts-Featherman and Hauser find no diminution in the effect of social origins on college attendance (1978, p. 25). In fact, Mare (1979) , using the same data, argues that once the overall increases in educational attainment have been taken into account, there has actually been an increase in the dependence of college access on social origins. Mare argues that the relative stability of the (regression coefficient) effect of social origins on college access across cohorts that Featherman and Hauser find is a function of the overall increase in educational attainment that offsets the increase in dependence on social class. With respect to the present point, it is only the finding about the youngest cohort that is relevant; Mare's point emerges because he controls for the very phenomenon that we are exploring. 12. Hearn (in press) summarizes the evidence on the various effects of college quality on students' attainments with respect to further education, occupational status, income, and career trajectory.
13. Once again, one might argue that in a society in which access to higher education is seen as democratic, distinctions among institutions of higher education rarely get official recognition.
14. For a definition, see table 1. As is evident, I have explicitly differentiated Ivy League and "other prestigious" institutions from Seven Sisters institutions. Rather than representing any assumption of gender-based hierarchy among these institutions, I separate them because of the stratification consequences of attendance at the different institutions.
15. One might ask how there could be declines in enrollments during a decade in which higher education massively expanded. The reason is that high school graduation rates also increased. If we were looking at the percentage of an age cohort that attended college we would be looking at increases. Once we restrict our examination to high school graduates, we are necessarily taking into account the selectedness of the group. In 1961, with less of the age cohort's being graduated from high school, the graduates were more selected, more elite, and hence more likely to attend a postsecondary institution.
16. Following a suggestion of ChristopherJencks, I have used 40-49-yearold males as a baseline against which to'measure changes in the educational distribution of college students' fathers. Although this ignores differential fertility, the bias should not change much over time.
17. Anonymous reviewers pointed out that working-class students did represent an official category in the sense that "low-income" students were potentially Karen recipients of federal financial aid monies. Although this is true, the comparison with African-Americans is noteworthy. It seems that there were two key differences between the "low-income" category and the "black" category: first, the latter category became entrenched in institutions of higher education themselves, thanks, in part, to federal incentives; and second, the latter was a political category that could be said to have been "asserted," whereas the former could be said to have been "assigned" administratively. 24. This pattern-of concern about standards and greater reliance on standardized tests-is precisely the one that we witnessed in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik and was apparently challenging our hegemony.
25. To the extent that women, like men, may be located anywhere in the class structure, the background resources-cultural, economic, social-that they have available for college are not necessarily different from those available to men (although historically, of course, strategies of social mobility and reproduction have been different). Once the women's movement broke the historical links between gender and college access and lessened those between gender and occupational attainment more generally, countermobilization by conservative groups could not directly affect women's enrollment. If, however, women did not have access to those resources, their enrollments would no doubt have fallen off as well. The obvious comparison group is blacks. Whites and blacks differ greatly in their social origins alnl. thus. in their background resources: ultimately, these differemnes manifest themselves in differences in standardized test scores. For women to increase their access to higher education. administrative decisions to apl)ly the same meritocratic criteria that had been applied to men wotil( be. to a large exteltl. sufficient. Fot increases in black
